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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
At the outset I would like to make one point very clear: this study 
is not meant to serve as a general appraisa l of all major airports and 
their delay characteristics. In the pages to follow I intend to show that 
a full marginal cost pricing policy may not be as straightforwardly appro-
priate at John F. Kennedy International Airport as many analysts have 
theorized for airports in general. Some of the evidence presented may be 
applicable in varying degrees to other major a i rports, but it is specific-
ally geared to John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK). 
Most of the analysis of airport congestion and its economic 
consequences took place during the 1968-71 period. It was then, in the 
late 1960s, that the congestion problem reached crisis proportions . 
"Stacked" and "put in a holding pattern" were phrases conunonly tossed about 
by air travellers using major metropolitan airports. Statistical analysis 
of traffic activity indicated intolerably high levels of delay and, when 
translated into dollar equivalents, tremendous economic costs . JFK 
Internationa~ being one of the nation's top five traffic hubs, was right 
up there among the most heavily congested airports . The traffic problem 
here was compounded by a factor which few other (if any) major hubs had 
to deal with: the close proximity of Newark and heavily used LaGuardia 
A special airspace structure (New York Metroplex). and facility (Conunon 
IFR Room) we.re created in 1969 to facilitate a more efficient flow of 
traffic and also increase the capacity of the area. 
2 
This situation stimulated a variety of studies in the economic 
literature which advocated a drastic change in the pricing policy used by 
airports in order to ration the use of these heavily congested facilities. 
Analysis was mainly quantitative with the emphasis on statistical analysis 
and subsequent economic interpretation of the results. 
As a con trast in style, my approach is roughly 90% qualitative or 
causal in nature. It is my contention that this approach is more appro-
priate for JFK in light of various events and circumstances that have 
evolved over the past 10 years . I have chosen to examine the possible 
causes behind the delays as well as certain factors inherent in JFK oper-
ations which contribute in varying degrees to the level and structure of 
delays, as well as attempt to dispel some myths and erroneous assumptions 
about the industry perpetuated in the literature. 
The first portion of the study is geared primarily toward giving the 
reader some general background on the concept of capacity, its measurement, 
as well as some technical data about JFK. Background material is also 
prsented on past programs aimed at alleviating airport congestion, crit-
i cisms of these programs, criticisms of the criticisms, and a look at the 
marginal cost concept for pricing airport runway services. 
As the reader proceeds through chapters IV, V, and VI the impression 
may occur that the fac tors detailed and evidence presented represent a 
100% coverage of the Kennedy delay-creating elements . This would be overly 
presumptuous on my part and as such would be self-defeating in the context 
of a causal approach. 
3 
Instead, I shall present certain evidence and draw specific 
conclusions about various phases of the activity at JFK which represent 
contributing elements to the problem of congestion and delay. The point 
emphasized here is that none of the factors dealt with can individually 
be regarded as "the cause." In combination they do explain many of the 
operational aspects of JFK International and are probably the major ele-
ments affecting its operation, but for the sake of generality and accuracy, 
I s hall assume that there are o ther elements involved which simply have 
not been included here. 
Finally, this study is not intended to serve as a complete negation 
of a full marginal cost pricing policy, but rather an investigation of 
specific aspects of JFK operations which tend to make marginal cost a very 
difficult concept to practically apply. At no point in this study have 
I denied the existence of delays and the associated social diseconomies, 
the existence of which theoretically dictates a congestion or delay toll 
be charged in the interest of economic use of scarce resources . The prob-
lem arises when we make the transition from theory to reality; accurate 
measurement of marginal costs is very difficult, especially when exter-
nalities such as noise, air and water pollution are taken into account; 
implementation of congestion toll pricing is not quite as simple and 
straightforward as much of the theoretical literature would convey (this 
is dealt with more specifically in a section on marginal cost pricing); 
and there are certain situations in which it is unclear as to exactly who 
should pay the congestion toll. 
4 
The depth and sophistication of this study was subject to a very 
strict f i nancial constraint: my checkbook. Much more in-depth experi-
mentation with s imulation and statis tical analysis would probably lead 
the analyst towards estimation of actual current marginal costs and an 
optimal strategy for its implementation into the airport system, but this 
involves a l o t of money and data which simply was not available to me. 
I do believe the reader will find the material interesting and quite read-
able, an in-depth knowledge of economics is not a prerequisite since theory 
is minimal while operational reality is maximized, given the constraints 
mentioned above . 
Throughout the narrative I have used the technical terminology of 
aviation as a means of smoother exposition and reduced volume of paper. 
In certain cases, I have provided brief definitions or explanat ions to 
aid the nonaviation-oriented reader. 
s 
CHAPTER I I. RUNWAY CAPACITY 
Determinants 
The term capacity is conventionally defined as an upper limit which 
a system or process cannot exceed due to a strict set of physical, economic 
or time constraints. For instance, a manufacturing plant is constrained, 
i.e . , its output, by the amount and availability of resources at any 
specific point in or period of time (other than the long run); every day 
we are aware of our capacity to accomplish a certain amount of work within 
a well-defined time framework. The point of these examples is that in 
the connnon usage of the term "capacity" we are talking about an inviolable 
level of activity which in all practicality cannot be surpassed. 
However, when dealing with the concept of runway capacity, we must 
be aware of the many complex and variable factors which come into play 
in the day-to-day operations of a major metropolitan airport. These 
factors_, which in certain combinations "change" the capacity of a runway, 
come under the following general headings: environmental conditions, 
airport geometry, aircraft mix and performance, and air traffic control 
procedures. 
Aircraft mix refers to the variety of aircraft which regularly use 
a specific airport. The degree of mix can be considered as a function of 
the diversity of equipment used by the airlines serving a particular city, 
while this, in turn, depends upon the volume of traffic generated and the 
role which the city assumes in the national transport system. For many 
6 
of the major hubs the mix of users runs the full gamut of airplane types, 
from the single engine general aviation type to the turbofan jumbo jets. 
At the airports in the New York Metro area, this variability is 
present and differs across airports. For instance, at LaGuardia the pri-
mary distinction is between general aviation (G.A.) and commercial air-
craft, the mix of jet traffic is relatively homogeneous with only minor 
exceptions. 1 The traffic for LaGuardia(hereafter identified as LGA) is 
mainly of a short to medium haul nature and thus, the type of aircraft 
used by the carriers reflects this fact. 
The situation at Kennedy is vastly different, where over half the 
daily operations are involved in medium to long haul routes, including 
international flights. Due to the tremendous number of jumbo jets and 
four-engine turbofan aircraft, JFK is known as the "heavy jet" airport 
2 
of the world. In addition, we also have the usual twin and tri-jet 
types (B727, DC9, etc.) as well as G.A. and connnunter turboprops. On any 
given day, one can observe a Pilgrim Airlines 20-seat Twin Otter in from 
Poughkeepsie, New York, taxiing with a British Airways 747 just in from 
London Heathrow. As we shall observe later, this mix variability is 
directly related to runway acceptance rates. 
\iost LGA traffic is of the 727, DC9 type, with only 
heavy jet DClO and L-lOlls. These two are the only types 
mitted to operate there due to the length of the runways. 
LGA's runways is supported by pilings in Flushing Bay and 
reinforced in preparation for the A300 Airbus. 
about 2- 5% being 
of heavy jet per-
Part of one of 
is now being 
2
Heavy jets are defined as those aircraft which are capable of takeoff 
weights of 300,000 pounds or more whether or not they are operating at this 
weight during a particular phase of flight. 
7 
Airport geometry or layout is another very important factor 
affecting the performance of an airpor t . This item includes such things 
as runway orientation, number and spacing of runways, their alignment 
with respect to each other, location and types of exits, taxiway system, 
and terminal location. 
At a major airport such as JFK, Chicago-O'Hare or Hartsfield-Atlanta, 
the primary objective of a runway-taxiway system should be the delivery 
of aircraft from their gate position to the runway (and vice versa) with 
a minimum of delay and conflicting movement with respect to other aircraft . 
Such improvements as high speed turnoffs and inbound-outbound taxiing 
systems at these and other major airports have done much to improve air-
craf t flows to and from the runway. 
The third general factor involved in any airpor t operation is the 
air traffic control system. It is the responsibility of the ATC system 
to guide all aircraft to and from the airport environs safely and with 
expediency, i.e., minimum delays to system users. One of the most impor-
tant elements of ATC service is to provide proper radar separation, both 
horizontally and vertically, between IFR (instrument flight rule) aircraft 
during various phases of flight. This separation becomes most pronounced 
during the last 20-40 miles of an arriving aircraft's r oute; it is at this 
time that arivals are lined up and sequenced for the approach to the air -
port area. The variability of the separation is a prime factor in estab-
3 lishing a delivery rate to the runway threshold, which in turn is a 
barometer of the level of hourly usage. 
3 
Runway threshold is the beginning of that portion of the runway usable 
for landing. 
8 
Separation standards are determined with essentially one element in 
mind: the differences in aircraft size and performance . Special pro-
cedures or separations must be used when there is a significant amount of 
variance in the type of traffic being processed through ATC. The presence 
of large jets or small commuter and G.A . type aircraft in a mixed flow 
dictates extra long separation distances in order to offset the effects 
of wake turbulence from large aircraft. The occurrence of wake turbulence 
is an important element in the ATC operations at JFK and, as such, should 
receive a bit of explanation. 
Every aircraft generates a pair of counter-rotating vortices trailing 
from the wing tips causing "wake turbulence." As aircraft become larger 
and heavier, the intensity of the vortices can pose significant problems 
for smaller aircraft. In fact, large aircraft generate vort ices with roll 
velocities exceeding the roll- control capability of some smaller aircraft. 
Therefore, under conditions where aircraft separation in the arrival or 
departure phase is. dictated by wake vortex strength considerations., this 
may be a limiting factor on runway capacity in segregated operations. 
Finally, the most significant, yet uncontrollable factor involved 
in airport operations is the weather. Later on in this study attention 
will be given to the influence of weather changes on operations at JFK, 
but for now, suffice it to say that various weather patter ns can cause an 
airport to experience some of its most extensive delay situations . Cer-
tain techniques and policies have been developed and are used to minimize 
the impact on traffic flows of adverse weather . 
9 
Definition and Measurement 
Runway capacity , in most cases, will vary from airport to airport, 
depending upon the layout of the runway(s) and terminal area as well as 
the location of the airport with respect to the surrounding conununity . 
There exists a great variety of runway configurations in use at airports 
in the United States. These layouts are mainly a function of anticipated 
4 traffic volume (number of runways) and meteorological and geographic 
characteristics of the area (orientation). 
One version of runway capacity is known as "ultimate" or "saturation" 
capacity [18, p. 112]. This represents the maximum number of aircraft 
operations that a given airport can accommodate during a specific interval 
of time under condi tions of continuous demand. A simple way of calculat-
ing this would be to take the reciprocal of the weighted average service 
times5 of the aircraf t using the facility . The weighting would be used 
6 to reflect the different requirements of various aircraft. This version 
of capacity would seem to adequately indicate a facili t y's engineering 
capabilities, but from an economic angle it is incomplete. No measure or 
consideration of delay o r congestion is incorporated in this definition, 
so we are talking about a physical number of planes and not necessarily 
an economically efficient number of planes. 
4 
As a general rule, the main traffic runways should be oriented as 
closely as practicahle in the direction of the prevailing winds. Optimum 
runway directions can be determined from a device known as a wind rose 
which measures wind direction as a percentage of time. 
5
service time is the time required to complete an operation before 
another aircraft may use the runway . 
6 
Example: Assume homogenous mix with 30 second service times. The 
hourly capacity would be: 1/.0083 = 120 movements/hour. 
10 
As a result we have the alternative definition known as "practical 
capacity . 11 This version states that capacity is that level of aircraft 
operations where the delays to the aircraft reach some maximum acceptable 
level. The definition is appealing in two respects : first, in contrast 
to ultimate capacity, this version does incorporate delay in conjunction 
with a level of activity; second, this definition implies that in the 
airside operation of an airport there are going to be some delays strictly 
due to the fact that there are s.o many coordinating elements involved and 
that it is unrealistic to expect these elements to perform flawlessly 
through time. In other words, there will be some average basic delay 
associated with each f light, having nothing to do with the congestion, 
but being simply a result of human factors operating in the dynamic setting 
of an air field operation. 7 I consider this allowance for some average 
basic "noncongestion" type delay to be a very good feature of this 
definition. 
There is a slight "weakness," however, in that the cal culated 
capacity can change without any alteration in physical facilities . 
The shape and position of the curve in Figure 2 .1 is significantly 
influenced by the pattern of demand during a period of time. In other 
words, this pattern is quite variable given a change in some of our in-
fluencing factors mentioned earlier . With varying patterns we can see 
7
rn establishing its on-time criteria, the CAB considers a flight 
to be 11 on time" if it is within 15 minutes of its scheduled time. 
A
v
er
ag
e 
D
el
ay
 
to
 
A
ir
c
ra
ft
 
F
ig
u
re
 2
.1
. 
S
p
e
c
if
ie
d
 L
ev
el
 o
f 
D
el
ay
 
• 
P
ra
c
ti
c
a
l 
C
ap
ac
it
y
 
fo
r 
S
p
e
c
if
ie
d
 L
ev
el
 o
f 
D
at
a 
D
es
ig
n
at
ed
 A
cc
ep
ta
b
le
 
L
ev
el
 
o
f 
D
el
ay
 
A
ir
c
ra
ft
 O
p
er
at
io
n
s/
H
o
u
r 
12 
that the prac tical capacity has changed while no alterations have been 
made to the airport ' s physical facilities.
8 
What should be the a cceptable level of delay? The Federal Aviation 
Administration has designated this to be four minutes average delay. The 
reason for choosing this figure was that its distribution is such that 
maximum delays will no t exceed twenty minutes and some aircraft will actu-
ally have only a few seconds delay [2, p. 17-1]. At higher levels of 
average delay, the distribution spreads rapidly to the point where some 
aircraft are encountering delays of forty minutes and higher. 
Calculations of these two versions of capacity involve different 
mathematical techniques. Experience has shown that the definition related 
to "ultimate" capacity yields values that are slightly larger than the 
definition which includes delay, but the difference is not large [18, p. 
112]. 
John F. Kennedy International 
By way of background, the initial Master Plan of 1946 for "New York 
International Airport" was conceived by the airlines and the city as a 
12 runway tangential pattern capable of 360 peak hour movements. This 
capacity was premised on the expected developments of precise approach 
aids and ATC that would permit the use of 6 runways simultaneously--3 
for landing and 3 for takeoff. 
In 1949, after extensive investigation of meteorological history, 
characteristics of existing and future aircraft and the likelihood of ever 
8 . 
Actually this is not a drawback at all, but merely a reflection of 
the influence meteorological conditions have on runway acceptance rates , 
i.e., the distinction between IFR and VFR capacity. 
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14 
achieving 100% efficient and precise traffic control, the Port Authority 
concluded that a basic runway pattern distribution should only include two 
9 
runway directions at approximate right angles. 
JFK International is charac terized today by this right 
angle-bidirectional runway pattern. 
10 Two sets of parallel runways with 
a centrally-located terminal area comprise the layout of one of the world's 
busiest airports. 
The capacity of an airport for aircraft movements is limited by its 
capability for handling inbound traffic under IFR conditions when all 
operations must be in the direction with least runway capacity . In the 
New York area, the prevailing wind is from the northwest, and the bulk of 
traffic (about 75%) operates from southeast (130°)-northwest (310°) run-
ways, but northeast winds require operations in the northeast (40°)-southwes t 
(220°) direction approximately 25% of the time during the months of Jan-
uary through June [23, p. 111) . All runways with the exception of 13R 
are ILS (Instrumen t Landing System) equipped for nearly all weather aper-
ation. The majority of runway exits are of the high speed design type, 
i.e., the angle that the exitway makes with the runway is very small, thus 
allowing aircraft to land and exit the runway at higher speeds permitting 
more rapid availability of the runway for use by the next aircraft. 
9
Information provided by Donald T. Foley, Aeronautical Services 
Division, JFK International. 
lOTh . ere 1s also a runway for small aircraft. 
15 
The preceding features of JFK a r e very important in enhancing 
capaclty utilization. The ILS facili ties11 help to minimize the reduction 
in capacity usually experienced during bad weather . For example, the low-
est I LS minimums accep t able at the airport are for runway 4R which permits 
operations down to 200 foot ceiling and 1,800 fee t visibility. When the 
weather does reach this level of severity , oper ations will naturally be 
slowed down for safe t y reasons , but the capacity loss will be kept t o a 
minimum by virtue of the excellent facilities . 
Before closing out this section, one other item should be mentioned 
which has a bearing on aircraft ground flows, it is known as a " cr ossing 
problem." This is a symptom of certain parallel configura tions in tha t 
aircraft landing on an "outer" runway may have t o taxi across the depar-
ture runway to reach the terminal. Fortunately , at JFK this problem is 
minimal . The 13L/31R - 13R/31L parallels have the terminal between them 
so that a crossing problem is nonexis t ent . Operations on the 4L/22R -
4R/22L parallels indicate a potential, but given the location of these 
points, arrival- departure interference is extremely minor. 
Arrivals on 31R - Departures on 311 is considered by air traffic 
personnel to be the optimum runway configur ation a t Kennedy due to noise 
abatement considerations, prevailing wind, and ease of access [17, p. 2). 
This configuration is also characterized by independent parallel operation. 
All configurations, however, are relatively free of arrival-departure 
dependencies . 
11
JFK is one of the world's most highly instrumented airports, with 
seven of eight runways instrumented . 
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CHAPTER III. CONGESTION REDUCTION 
History 
The prevailing system of landing fees at virtually every air carrier 
airport in the United States and much of the rest of the world is one 
which is based on aircraft weight . Such a system is known technically as 
"value of service pricing" because the price is related to the value of 
the service rendered by the airport to the individual user rather than 
to the marginal or additional cost incurred as a result of each use. 
Until several years ago , value of service pricing was a fairly 
appropriate system for New York and other underutilized airports. For 
the most part, airport airside cos t s are fixed. Runway and taxiway systems 
are a " once only" cost, allowing for routine periodic maintenance. Due 
to the surplus capacity that most airports have had in the past, business 
and revenue could be maximized by the use of prices that charged most of 
the fixed costs agains t those most able to pay them--large, usually com-
mer cial, aircraft. This enabled airports to charge quite low prices to 
small planes that would be deterred from using an airport ii they had to 
pay many of the fixed costs involved. Aircraft weight, which is a simple 
and fairly accurate proxy for the value of airport runway service, is 
widel y used as a basis for runway charges . 
Unfortunately, due to the tremendous growth in traffic in the 1960s 
and the introduction of jet aircr aft into connnercial service, this policy 
became less and less appropriate at major airports such as JFK, O'Hare 
18 
and Washington National. At these high density airports about 70-90% of 
the users are connnercial air carriers using jet aircraft ranging from 
twin engine DC9s to wide-body jumbo jets. For JFK the ratio of commercial 
traffic to general aviation is approximately 9:1, with roughly 50% of the 
conunercial traffic being of the "heavy jet" category. The "encouraged 
presence" of the small G.A. aircraft in a traffic environment such as 
Kennedy created certain operationally and economically awkward situations. 
In 1967, at Senate Aviation subcommittee hearings, Alan S. Boyd, 
Secretary of Transportation, s ugges ted that airports might try offering 
incentives to both air carriers and general aviation to use airports less 
at peak hours by raising airport charges for services provided during 
these hours and lowering them during the off-hours [16, p. 26]. 
On August 1, 1968, the Port Authority imposed a $25 minimum fee on 
flights at the three major airports during certain hours believed to be 
12 
particularly busy. All pre-August charges were based on weight except 
for a $5 minimum charge. The increase was designed to eliminate some of 
the most inefficient users of the airport; i . e., those users and potential 
users who valued the use of the airport during the hours concerned at less 
than $25. As a result, there was a significant decline in general aviation 
traffic at JFK. In comparison to July, 1968, the declines r egistered in 
August and September (pf the same year) during peak hours were 47% and 54%, 
respectively. For the same periods, the change in general aviation as a 
12
The minimum fee applies to aircraft, with seating configurations 
of less than 25 passengers, which either land or take-off at JFK, 
or EWR during the periods 0800-1000, Monday-Friday, and from 1500-2000 
every day. 
19 
percentage of to tal movements went from 5.7% in July to 3.6% in August 
and 3.1% in September during peak hours (25]. Data for that year as well 
as 1969 and 1970 verified the success of PONYA's action. The level, and 
more importantly, the structure of G.A . usage of JFK had been significantly 
13 
altered, aircraft delays were reported much lower. 
At this time there was another congestion-reduction program instituted 
by the Federal Aviation Administration being used at certain heavily con-
gested airports in the eastern United States. The program, known as 
"High Density Traffic Airports" (HDTA), was implemented in reaction to 
the exceptionally high degree of congestion at certain key airports during 
July and August, 1968. 
In order to provide immediate relief, the F.A.A. designated five 
airports as HDTA and then imposed a reservations system together with other 
limitations that airport users were required to follow as a condition to 
use these airports . The basic rule was made effective on April 27, 1969. 
The system was promoted as being equitable, since all classes of aircraft 
operators were free to use any of these a irports on a first come, first 
served basis so long as the operations di d not exceed the quota specified. 
During the succeeding two years the F.A .A. gathered and catalogued much 
statistical information in order to evaluate the HDTA system. The con-
clus i ons were that the percentage of aircraft de l ays at the five airports 
decreased s ubstantially and that there was a reduction in average daily 
operations. 
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( 24 ] . Also a t this tiJDe there was a relatively small decline for 
air taxi activity a t JFK . This resulted from permits issued to a ir taxi 
operators exempting them from the $25 fee if they used a nonduty runway. 
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Objections to the HDTA quota system generally were based on the 
following: discrimination against certain classes of users; termination 
of the long-established policy of first come-first served; and not a 
proper exercise of the F.A.A. administrator's au thority under the Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958. 
In response, the F.A.A. indicated that the Administrator's discretion 
under the Act is broad enough to permit him to implement any remedy which 
has a real and substantial relation to the goal of affecting the efficient 
utilization of airspace so long as the action taken is not unreasonable, 
arbitrary or capricious. The rule does grant a greater priority to cer-
tificated air carriers who provide common carriage service. This is con-
sistent with the policy of recognizing the national interest in maintaining 
a public mass air transportation system. So long as capacity is adequate 
to meet the demands of all airspace users without unreasonable delay or 
inconveninece, "first come-first served" remains the fundamental policy, 
however, when capacity limitations compel a choice, the public service 
offered by the common carrier must be preferred (10). 
Review of Past Programs 
The PONYA pricing alteration and the F. A.A. 's HDTA system are the 
two major congestion-relief programs over the last 10 years. Reactions 
to the two plans were varied and, in most cases, justified from an economic 
viewpoint. 
PONYA ' s pricing scheme was the more acceptable in economic circles 
simply because it was an attempt to relieve congestion through the price 
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mechanism. Viewed as a "small hesitant faltering step ... towards a more 
rational price system," [31, p. 145), it was the first real use of the 
price mechanism to eliminate users on the basis of valuation. Economists 
saw this as a move in the right direction--that direction towards a mar-
ginal cost pricing policy . 
Yet, in the light of its effect on G.A . users, it was judged 
insufficient, i.e., not a large enough increase . Some have advocated a 
$100 minimum14 fee; this would virtually eliminate all G.A. traffic from 
the airport during the designated hours. Given the effects of the $25 
minimum, it seems that further increases would lead to decreasing marginal 
effects on G.A. traffic , and beyond a certain point any additional increase 
may be unwarranted or unnecessary. Also during a period of such increases , 
the problem may become more political than economical . 
The second program, originated by the F.A.A. was for the most part 
dismissed by analysts due to its "arbitrary" nature and detachment from 
a pricing mechanism. Some of the main objections and F.A.A. response to 
those objections have already been given, but a few additional thoughts 
have occurred on this particular item. 
First, on a technical note, I have found certain studies15 which have 
misinterpreted the HDTA system . From the phrase "IFR reservations" or 
"IFR operations quota," analysts have taken this to mean that the system 
is only used in bad or IFR weather [5, p. 27]. There is a difference 
14 
(31, p. 154; 23, p. 24). 
15 
(32, p. 149; 23 , p. 23]. 
22 
between an IFR operation and IFR weather . IFR weather implies that 
meteorological conditions are such that the operation of a flight with 
respect to visual reference outside the aircraft is inappropriate . 
As the speed of aircraft and the density of traffic in the airspace 
increased, there was more concern over the possibility of midair collisions . 
Accordingly, in certain parts of the airspace, IFR rules have been pre-
scribed regardless of weather conditions. This is referred to as "posi-
tive control airspace" (18, p. 89) . A flight conducted under IFR in con-
trolled airspace must submit a flight plan and, thereafter, comply with 
ATC clearances or traffic control instructions (15, p. 30]. All commer-
cial airline flights conducted at the HDTA's are under IFR, regardless 
of the weather. 
Another point raised was that the quota was fixed far in excess of 
what could be handled under "IFR conditions." First of all, the quota 
was, and is, not "fixed" in the sense of a strict upper limit; operations 
are allowed without reservations if they can be accommodated without ad-
verse effect on allocated operations. 
Secondly, this statement, again, indicates a misinterpretation of 
"IFR reservations." As stated by the F.A.A. (10, p. 18], the number of 
allocations specified are in excess of the capacities of the airports to 
handle IFR traffic in IFR conditions with minimum delays and they were 
selected with the realization that under IFR weather conditions delays will 
occr. Permitting some delay appeared preferable to restricting the total 
operations to the actual IFR minimum delay capacity resulting in unused 
capacity when the weather is above IFR conditions. 
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In some cases, the HDTA system was refer r ed to as an "arbitrary 
assignment of landing and takeoff slots" (20, p. 197). This suggests a 
"shot in the dark" methodology as well as a passive role for the air car-
riers. The basic rule, issued on November 27, 1968, was made effec tive 
on April 27, 1969. During this five-month period the air carriers and 
scheduled air taxi operators, acting in concert through scheduling com-
mittees, were able to scale down their scheduled operations to satisfy 
the quota allocations. The F.A.A . experience, as indicated by statistical 
study covering the four-month period subsequent to the issuance of the 
rules showed that none of the users were deprived of the use of any of 
the five HDTA, except on infrequent occasions , and only during the early 
evening rush hours. During the sixteen- month period following issuance, 
the Airport Reservations Office of the F.A.A . was able to approve or pro-
vide an acceptable alternative reservation for virtually all requests 
[11, p. 29]. The ruling was supported by the airl ines both in its ini-
tial issuance and through periodic extensions. 
"Arbitrary" is exactly the word used in describing what a ruling by 
the Administrator should not be. His authority t o establish measures for 
the efficient and safe utilization of airspace is based on the condition 
that such actions taken are not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious (11, 
p. 29]. 
Finally, when a new proposal or amendment to an old one is made public 
through an announcement in the Federal Register, called a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM), written comments are solicited from the general public, 
public officials and other interested parties. I n reviewing the F.A . A. 's 
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background material and amendments fo r the HDTA system I noticed something 
about the nature of the objections raised concerning HDTA. In one su~h 
amendment [10, p. 17], 11 categories of assertions were listed in reaction 
to the quota sys t em. Among these I found absolutely nothing in the way of 
an objection to the system on economic grounds. No where in the series 
of amendments and NPRM's is found any protest to the fact that congestion 
reduction was attempted (and was successful) through a means completely 
removed from that which economic efficiency would dictate, i.e., the price 
mechanism. 
Yet, during this period (1968-1972) a host of studies appears in the 
literature which shows in various ways how a pricing solution ("peak load" 
and"marginal cost") would lead to the most efficient outcome and maximize 
general welfare. If the quota system was so economically objectionable, 
why was no protest raised (where it would be heard) by analys ts in 
the field? 
Marginal Cost Pricing 
The use of some economic incentive rather than various administrative 
controls could alleviate long-term allocation and development problems if 
those incentives could be tied to the true costs and benefits of airport 
access. 
The basic cost of an operation without delays might be $X. This cost 
would remain approximately constant for each operation until the number of 
operations approaches the maximum capacity of the airpor t. From this 
point on there will be a critical divergence between cost as perceived by 
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the individual (private) and the costs incurred by the system as a whole 
(social). With the facility now becoming i ncreasingly congested, each 
additional or "marginal" user will incur a cost of usage as well as im-
posing delays and costs on other users. Thus, we have the two components 
of total delay at a congested facility: private (individual delay and 
cost) and social (delay and costs imposed on other system users by a mar-
ginal operator). It is the specific purpose of a marginal cost pricing 
policy to recover the gap between social and private cost and give oper-
a tors a more economically accurate sense of their airport cost impact. 
The economic theory of congestion indicates that if a user is not 
required to take into account the cost he imposes on others, a facility 
will be overused. Efficient usage of the facility would require a "con-
gestion toll" equal to the cost of delay that the marginal user imposes--
marginal external delay. Theoretically, social costs would be covered 
and congestion decreased. The difficulty lies in determining the social 
costs and properly adjusting fees to reflect them . Unfortunately , there 
are a number of factors that complicate the determination of such a price 
structure , ranging from analytical obstacles to policy questions specific 
to certain sensitive segments of aviation. 
One immediate problem is the fact that there is no guarantee that 
setting landing fees equal to some fixed component plus the marginal 
delay cost at a particular time will lead to equilibrium conditions. An 
immediate institution of a marginal cost pricing scheme could have the 
effect of overly reducing traffic. Adjustmen ts (possibly drastic} made 
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by the scheduled carriers would change the structure and possibly the 
level of airport usage which would, in turn, create a new set of prices. 
With prices readjusted downward, some operations that had been driven away 
previously would be lured back. This sequence might continue interminably 
with no assurance of eventual convergence to an equilibrium level of 
prices. Over time such undamped oscillations in prices and traffic would 
be dynamically unstable and less than optimally efficient [5 , p. 114). 
An actual "equilibrium" marginal cost price would be such that if 
recomputed in the same way using data generated since the previous recom-
puta tion, the change in prices would reflect only normal traffic growth . 
Equilibrium prices differ from full MC prices in that they allow for the 
effects of the reduced use resulting from high prices [5, p. 115). 
So we can conclude that use of full marginal costs as prices without 
some sort of practical adjustments would introduce potential economic 
volatility into the airport system. However, to determine by analytical 
means a set of equilibrium prices would be a formidable task. Knowledge 
of traffic pattern variation under different sets of prices would be a 
necessary precondition to determination of such an equilibrium. 
Unfortunately, prior research in this area has not considered demand 
elasticity, i . e., there is no information on the sensitivity of airport 
demand to changes in runway usage charges. And, without this information, 
the effects of any specific price structure on the pat t ern of demand for 
airport operations cannot be predicted (30 , p. 30]. 
The air transport system in this country is composed of a very complex 
network of airports ranging in size from the 5,000 acre Kennedy to the 
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much smaller community fields served by local carriers . In such an 
interdependent environment the problem of congestion a t any one airport 
cannot be considered in isolation. To determine a truly optimal airport 
price structure, it would have to be determined for networks of airports 
rather than for just one. Such a mathematical endeavor would require a 
degree of complexity far beyond current analytical models and techniques 
(30, p. 31]. 
Marginal cos t pricing could result in a schedul e of charges which 
may be hard for cer tain kinds of aviation or types of flights to pay . 
Regional (local), commuter carriers and short- haul trunks would be strongly 
affected. Pure marginal pricing would probably eliminate flights for 
which the airport fees are a significant percentage of the value of the 
flight to the operator. 
This is, in fact, the purpose of such a price structure--to ration 
out low value users; but if we consider the value of such flights not only 
in terms of their revenue but also in the context of thei r role in the 
air transport system, additional consideration is necessary. 
The commuter and local service (local carriers, better known as 
regional carriers, are slowly moving out of the small community category 
and are operating more like trunks} carriers provide air transport on routes 
of lesser density between small traffic centers and between those centers 
and principal centers . They serve those routes which have been abandoned 
by the major trunks due to uneconomic operations and company expansion. 
As such, they provide a very important feeder function, i.e., bringing 
passenger traffic to the major airports which otherwis e may not have used 
28 
the major trunks. Carriers such as Ozark, Southern, Allegheny, Ransome , 
Pilgrim, etc. , generate passenger traffic for the larger trunk airlines 
and thus, provide a valuable service in t he air transport system. 
Airport administration coul d hardly be expected to make such a radical 
change in pricing policy in a single step, given the extremely different 
natures of the current and proposed systems . A great deal of their appr e-
hension would be with respect to the reactions by various aviation 
interest groups. In addition, the inability of analysts and of economic 
theory to determine in advance equilibrium pricing schedules and to fore-
cast the precise effects of marginal cost pricing on airport usage raises 
some financial risks [30, p . 36]. 
A true and satisfying evaluation of the economic and political costs 
and benefits of marginal cost pricing can onl y come about by actual ex-
perience and not theory . 
This will conclude most of the background material on airport 
congestion in the New York area. The usual format for this type of study 
is to include a "review of literature" section dealing with previous pub-
lications in the field. Due to the limited amount of material (especially 
during the last few years) and the structuring of my work, I shall inter-
sperse such critical reviews throughout the analysis where appropriate . 
I believe that this approach will better lend itself to organization and 
continuity. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE MAIN CHAPTER 
Runway Capacity and Ut i lization 
Runway capacity and utilization deals with the ac tual amount of 
hourly traffic in relation to the designated hourly capacity of the runway 
system in use. The Federal Aviation Administration through its Eastern 
Regional Office has specified capacities for JFK's major configurations. 
As shown in Table 4. 1 , the se figures vary slightly across configurations, 
but rather substantially across weather conditions, the maximum capacity 
occurring when the weather is VFR, allowing visual approaches (VAPS) by 
certain aircraft, and use of a side runway. This side runway feature is 
one which, of the three New York airports, only JFK is able to make full 
usage of due to the size of the field and the runway layout. For example, 
if the duty runways are designated as 22R/L, overflow traffic can be 
cleared for 13R. Operations in this pattern will , for the most part, be 
noninterfering and will take some of the pressure away from the main flow. 
All of JFK's parallel configurations permit use of a side runway under 
VFR conditions to enhance traffic flows and capacity. 
In spite of the high capacity layout and the relatively sophisticated 
instrumentation of the runways, analysis of F.A.A. statistics and airline 
schedules reveals some surprising results concerning the utilization of 
that capacity . It is my content ion that through a combination of reduced 
airline activity and increased acceptance rates, excess capacity exists 
at JFK. 
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Table 4.1. John F. Kennedy Internat i ona l Engineering Performance 
Standa rds (EPS)a 
Config. VFR 
ARR - DEP !FR BASIC VAPSb VAPS + SIDE 
4R 4L 52 71 71 81 
221 22R 52 71 71 81 
31R 311 68 71 71 81 
131 13R 61 71 71 81 
Single runway 45 45 
a Source : [ 19). 
b 
YAPS refers to visual approaches. 
Proof of the l at t er portion of the pr eceding statement was arrived 
at by analysis of F.A.A. Per formance Meas urement Standards reports which 
contain daily summaries of hourly traff ic activity at JFK during the hours 
from 1200-2100 local time , listing actual traffic using Kennedy runways 
and the EPS appropria t e to the configura tion in use. A comparison of the 
two numbers gives a performance index (PI) which represents the percentage 
of EPS capacity utilized in that hour. Table 4 . 2 presents a listing of 
the Pis for the month of March, 1977 . 
Initially, the r eader will no tice that capacity utilization is 
relatively low between 1200 and 1500, many of the Pis being less than 50%; 
however, this is no t at all unusual for most of the na tion 's airports, be-
ing merely a reflection of the fact that airport usage is a very definite 
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a 
Table 4.2. Runway Capacity Utilized as a Percentage of EPS 
Hour 
Date 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
March 1, 1977 38 41 45 59 75 67 78 91 
2 39 39 41 59 77 65 84 68 
3 37 42 43 53 70 77 90 98 
4 37 41 39 49 80 90 96 90 
5 33 41 43 58 74 78 69 84 
6 33 36 48 53 85 65 90 89 
7 35 39 51 45 74 83 78 84 
8 38 61 61 51 80 74 81 85 
9 39 52 38 62 68 74 78 78 
10 37 46 55 54 78 77 78 91 
11 58 62 56 58 73 79 79 86 
12 59 78 64 77 99 50 65 96 
13 44 31 42 63 48 44 54 85 
14 38 39 58 58 73 70 72 88 
15 39 41 48 68 78 73 75 84 
16 41 42 39 66 73 79 72 90 
17 51 49 55 34 77 64 84 106 
18 44 50 54 58 96 106 100 110 
19 32 46 38 56 75 69 65 93 
20 35 67 60 81 104 106 119 133 
21 49 35 54 59 77 78 70 85 
22 38 49 49 21 48 64 75 85 
23 39 46 56 46 70 77 83 84 
24 46 54 61 59 80 75 86 106 
25 44 54 45 82 81 73 94 lQO 
26 28 31 52 68 86 75 80 90 
27 37 30 51 63 79 81 81 89 
a 
Source: (9) . 
20 21 
63 72 
62 64 
63 70 
75 73 
63 63 
69 63 
49 67 
63 67 
58 65 
72 65 
67 64 
106 100 
86 71 
49 67 
58 67 
69 79 
83 62 
127 100 
65 69 
112 100 
49 67 
59 67 
56 72 
74 
70 65 
63 69 
65 79 
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Table 4.2 . (continued) 
Hour 
Date 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
March 28, 1977 44 31 45 88 75 93 93 92 64 60 
29 45 38 63 59 83 73 79 86 60 62 
30 39 35 44 109 116 89 97 88 102 108 
31 44 39 48 54 89 79 85 91 85 70 
function of time and that this period is one of characteristically low 
traffic activity. The Pis for the late afternoon and evening hours show 
the increase in activity associated with the classic airport "rush hour, 1116 
which, again, is common in varying degrees to the majority of the world's 
airports as well as most transport systems (air or surface). 
The real significance of these Performance Indexes becomes evident 
when they are aggregated categorically. The results are as follows: 
% of Capacity Utilized % of Time Occurring 
greater than 100% 5% 
80-100% 21% 
less than 80% 74% 
For various reasons, to be dealt with in succeeding sections, the runway 
capacity of JFK is underutilized a substantial portion of the time. 
16 
The term "rush hour" in this context does not ref er to a single 
60-minute hour, but rather a period of time usually from 1500-2000 hours 
(local time). 
33 
However, reiterating the introductory theme, this does not prove the 
nonexistence of delays and social costs, it is merely a comparison of cal-
culated practical capacity versus actual usage. 
An objection might be raised at this point concerning the limited 
sample used of one month out of possibly an entire year . The reader must 
keep in mind that the type of traffic involved here is composed of over 
90% scheduled commercial flights whose daily operations do not vary 
(with the exception of unscheduled changes) to any recognizable degree. 
If we use the Official Airline Guide [26] as a barometer of schedule 
variability, the majority of schedule alterations occur at time changes, 
i.e., daylight savings-standard time. The fluctuation from month to 
month would probably have only very minor effects on the results of 
Table 4.2. 
Another objection might be that the presence of adverse weather 
introduced some distortion into the Pls. The effect of weather on 
Kennedy operations will be discussed later in an i mportant section on 
delays, but suffice it to say for now that weather problems are common 
to all months and that the EPS do vary to reflect changing airport en-
vironmental conditions. 
The former portion of the statement made earlier made reference to 
a decline in airline activity as a contributing factor to subcapacity 
utilization of runways at Kennedy International. Proof of this statement 
was reached by a comparison of airline schedules listed in the Official 
Airline Guide for October, 1977, with an "average schedule" as compiled 
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by Carlin and Park [5, p . 45] for the weeks of September 1, 1967, and 
February 1, 1968. The results are shown in Table 4.3. 
The results are rather impressive. A very substantial decline in 
the level of sched uled flights has occurred since 1968. The morning hours 
registered some of the more dramatic changes while the afternoon and even-
ing changes, although still quite substantial, were smaller by comparison. 
This seemingly unbalanced decrease between the two periods may be, in 
part, accounted for by the relative volume of traffic carried during those 
hours. 
Overall, there were 142.3 fewer arrivals, 164.9 fewer departures 
and a total of 317.2 fewer operations scheduled for October, 1977. In 
terms of a time frame of reference, Carlin and Park's composite schedule 
listed 838 operations during a 15-hour period, while the CATER LOG [l] 
for October 7, 1977, showed 889 actual operations in 24 hours. 
Table 4.4 presents a similar analysis for actual general aviation 
traffic; notice again the tremendous decline in the level of activity. 
To get more of an idea why airports were so congested and delays so 
high, let me recreate a situation which could have occurred at JFK in the 
late 1960s . 
With 1978 technology, basic VFR capacity is 71 operations/hour; in 
terms of 1967-68 capability , the capacity would be much lower, possibly 
in the 50-60 operations/hour range . Suppose the configuration in use on 
a given day had a capacity of 52 operations/hour, the airport would be 
operating near capacity all morning with the heavier evening rush still 
Table 4.3. A Comparison of Air Carrier Scheduled Operations: 1977a 
versus 1967-68b 
8 am 9 10 11 12 l~ 14 
ARRIVALS 
c & p 17.9 15.1 20.3 17.2 24.8 21.4 29 . 3 
10-77 11 2 9 8 5 12 19 
% REDUCTION 39 87 56 53 80 44 35 
DEPARTURES 
c & p 33.9 33.7 28.5 18.4 26.1 20.1 24 . 2 
10-77 10 23 16 9 11 11 6 
% REDUCTION 71 32 44 51 58 45 75 
TOTAL 
c & p 51. 9 48 . 8 48.8 35.6 50.9 41.5 53.5 
10-77 21 25 25 17 16 23 25 
% REDUCTION 60 49 49 52 69 45 52 
a 
Source : [ 26]. 
b Source: [ 5' p. 45]. 
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to come . Keep in mind that I have assumed VFR conditions! Lower the 
ceilings and(or) visibility, add thunderstorms or snow flurries or any 
type of IFR weather and the runway capacity will get much lower, making it 
difficult for the airport to accormnodate scheduled traffic without delays. 
Runway instrumentation has increased and improved since those days, 
in 1972, three new ILS's were installed on runways 4L/22R and 31L in 
addition to an approach lighting system on 13L. Improved ILS's were in-
stalled in 1974 on 13L/31R and 4R/22L to i ncrease JFK's all weather capa-
bility. Installation of an all-weather guidance system on runways at all 
three airports in the metro area for landings in visibility as low as a 
quarter of a mile was completed during 1975 ( 24 ]. 
Before closing out this section, one other item is of considerable 
interest when examined in retrospect in light of its current status . 
During the initial 16-month period following the implementation of the 
F.A.A. 's High Density Reservations System (1968-1969), the Airport Reser-
vations Office was able to approve or provide an acceptable alternative 
reservation for virtually all requests [12]. In other words, carriers had 
trimmed schedules and were making full or very close to full usage of 
available slots. 
Now, contrast that situation with the one described in Table 4.5 . 
Actual total operations during system hours leave a fairly substantial 
number of excess slots when compared with the allowable upper limit. Even 
more striking is the number of unused slots for air carrier operations; 
with 80 available slots, 70 or more were utilized in only 3 .7% of the in-
stances shown, 60 or less were utilized about 68% of the time. 
Table 4 .5. Actual Operations Counts Compared to Levels Specified 
F.A.A.'s High Density Reservations System at JFKa 
by the 
Total 0Eerations During HDRS Hours 
UPPER LIMIT = 90 
1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 
July 1, 1976 49 72 70 74 83 66 
2 54 76 81 89 78 75 
12 55 77 60 71 71 58 
20 50 76 67 74 80 58 
28 50 67 70 67 65 67 
June 4, 1976 47 72 78 72 75 53 
12 51 64 71 70 71 64 
20 48 65 66 64 67 70 
28 51 71 71 75 82 56 
Sept. 30, 1977 66 78 69 85 63 78 
Oct. 7, 1977 55 77 74 75 75 68 
8 45 66 74 65 72 59 
June 1, 1976 
2 
3 
5 
6 
7 
aSource: ARING CATER LOGS. 
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Air Carrier Operations During HDRS Hours 
UPPER LIMIT = 80 
1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 
42 59 62 65 75 59 
38 56 63 67 64 66 
46 65 51 60 62 48 
44 67 56 65 71 50 
41 58 60 57 56 61 
42 59 62 59 63 49 
45 56 59 60 62 55 
43 58 54 53 61 60 
42 60 57 61 70 49 
49 60 51 67 53 64 
43 65 54 58 59 56 
42 55 59 51 64 50 
32 46 46 56 58 58 
45 59 61 59 58 45 
43 64 54 62 58 57 
45 57 61 60 60 49 
41 66 55 58 64 55 
34 44 74 55 57 50 
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The economic theory of congestion, as mentioned earlier, specifies 
that, if the users of a facility are not required to take into account 
the cos t they impose on others (external diseconomy) , i.e., a marginal 
cost , a facility will be overused (33 , p . 34]. The evidence presented 
in this section demonstr ates that in te rms of available capacity , JFK ' s 
runway facilities are "underused" over 75% of the time . 
This conclusion is not meant to preclude the exis tence of social 
and private diseconomies among users , but the data and the theoretical 
principle do c r ea t e a curious paradox . 
Airlines and Airports 
In mu ch of the literature of the late 1960s and early 1970s dealing 
with airport congestion , the schedul ed ai r carriers were treated as both 
victims of and contributing elements to the problem. Models developed 
to derive pricing solutions often made various assumptions and stat ements 
about airline activity , including their demand for r unway usage , schedul ing 
and fares. For these models or derived solutions to be usable or viable 
as solutions, we must be assured that t he assumptions made are either 
correct or sufficiently approximate reality. In going through studies on 
this topic , I have noted a number of instances where the writer(s) , al-
though unchallenged for their economic expertise, has(have) demonstrated 
a lack of t echnical knowledge with respec t to some of these topics . 
To begin wi t h, demand for runway space, or for that matter airspace , 
i s what is termed in economics as a derived demand . It is derived f r om 
the demand for air travel by the genera l public and is r e flected in the 
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schedules which the airlines publish. In a real sense, it is the traveling 
public that schedules the airlines. It is the job of the schedule planner 
to interpret the public's desires, and match them as closely as possible 
with an operationally workable schedule network. In other words, when 
you look at the timetable for an airline you are looking at proof of the 
carrier's commitment of capital investment in response to a forecasted 
17 
pattern of passenger demand with respect to time . 
Some writers18 have stated that this demand for runway space is a 
function of the user charges in effect at an airport. This suggests a 
variable schedule of landing charges; however, the Port Authority in their 
"Schedule of Charges for Air Terminals," specify a minimum user charge 
for air carrier operations which is invariant over time, plus a per thou-
sand pounds of maximum gross weight charge .19 The charge does vary for 
certain hours of the day for aircraft whose seating configuration is for 
less than 25 passengers, this includes all general aviation and most com-
muter and air taxi operations. 
Looking at this idea from another angle, Jackson [20, p. 199 ] asserts 
that hourly capacity utilization i s not a function of time of day. This 
statement does not hold up whether we look at general aviation traffic or 
17
For all intents and purposes, this may be interpreted as time of 
day, since seasonal fluctuations in traffic involve an adjustment of that 
daily pattern. 
18 
[22 , p. 14; 20. , p. 198]. 
19 
Maximum gross weight means the maximum weight which an aircraft 
may lawfully have at the time of leaving the ground at any airport in the 
United States. 
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scheduled carriers. General aviation users, since they are not on a 
scheduled basis, will be very responsive to any differential structuring 
of landing fees, which in turn is usually a function of time of day. The 
relationship between airline scheduling and passenger demand over time 
has already been explained. In light of this and personal interviews with 
controllers at the CIFRR and Kennedy Tower, Jackson's statement is rather 
puzzling. 
Earlier I discussed the F.A.A.'s Reservations or Quota System and 
its impact on airport cnngestion. Yance [32, p. 280] makes an interesting 
point concerning a redistributive drawback of that system . He states that 
under a pricing scheme, a "slot" in the reservations system would connnand 
a scarcity price and revenues earned through flight operations would go 
to the airport as "scarcity rent. " Since t he quota is defined by a specific 
level of operations rather than explicit prices, Yance claims that the 
quota results in large airport rents going to the airlines. I find this 
to be a reasonable line of argument, but I also believe that this rent 
or scarcity price is far lower today than at the time Yance published his 
work. 
My reasoning behind that statement hinges on the fact that I have 
already demonstrated the existence of a substantial number of excess slots 
currently available under the HDTA reservations system. Given this "ex-
cess supply" of slots or nonscarcity, the price of a slot or reservation 
should be quite low, possibly even in the neighborhood of current PONYA 
charges. 
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Further criticism of the HDTA system was presented by Walters [31~ 
p. 149) in his claim tha t the main effect of the system was to "keep out" 
the airlines who did not appear on the scheduling committee under the 
"grandfather clause." 
Most all air carriers in the United States today , transporting the 
majority of the air traveling public , are Certificated Air Carriers as 
granted by the Civil Aeronautics Board. The Civil Aeronautics Act pro-
vided for the automatic granting of a certificate~ in 1938, to those car-
riers who had been in continuous operation, and in possession of an airmail 
contract, for a period of 90 days prior to the passage of the Act. This 
was known as the Grandfather Clause. 
As a result of this clause, 16 major domstic airlines were granted 
Certificates of Convenience and Necessity and became the nucleus of the 
airline industry. Of this original 16, there are now 11 as a result of 
mergers during the years. 
Current Eleven Air Carriers at JFK 
American American 
Braniff Braniff 
Continental (not in route structure) 
Delta Delta 
Eastern Eastern 
National National 
Northwest Northwest 
Pan Am Pan Am 
Trans World Trans World 
United United 
Western (not in route structure) 
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In view of this listing and the conditions specified by the HDTA 
rulings [12], I fail to see how any airlines were "kept out." 
There is one more aspect of the airline industry which has been 
repeatedly misstated, misinterpreted and erroneously presented: airline 
fares. 
Numerous writers in their development of a theory of airline economics 
have made assertions such as the following: airlines are not free to 
choose the fares they wish to charge ... , regulated airlines competing 
on a given route usually charge identical fares (7, p. 4]; the CAB speci-
fies the fares for the route (31 , p. 151]; (airline) fare level is exogen-
ously determined [14, p. 277]; the CAB has the responsibility .. . of 
determining the fare [6, p. 309]. These statements are simply not correct . 
Insofar as the air traveling public is concerned, control over fares 
and rates is probably the Board's most important function. Passenger 
fares and cargo rates are not set by the Board, however, but r ather by 
the air carriers themselves . This is not a l ways understood by the public, 
but no passenger fare or cargo rate can take effect unless an air carrier 
files a tariff with CAB. The Board may prefer a different fare or rate , 
but there is no authority in the Act [21, p. A-46] which pennits the 
Board to require a carrier to charge a particular fare or rate. Even the 
Board's authority to disapprove a particular fare or rate is somewhat 
limited, in that the Board cannot summarily disapprove a tariff; it only 
has authority to suspend it for a limited period of time pending investi-
gation [3, p . 19). 
46 
Once a particular far is approved, all carriers are not required to 
charge that fare. They usually do, due to the competitive nature of the 
industry [ 29, p . 39) . 
Finally, the impression widely exists that airlines bunch flights 
at a few peak hours. and that airport congestion could be materially eased 
if the schedules were spread out a bit. This phenomenon is often called 
"peaking" or "over-scheduling. " Rose and Hamilton [ 28, p. 3] state that 
in any given time period there is a surplus of flights over and above that 
which is required to move the demand. 
There are many complex factors involved in the scheduling process 
including airport regulations, and geographic and time zone considerations. 
Before discussing their importance, let me present some actual airline 
schedules as contained in the October, 1977, Official Airline Guide. 
Tables 4.6 through 4.9 illustrate the typical distribution of scheduled 
flights during the "normal" operating hours of the day. The frequencies 
shown in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 represent the scheduled oper ations of all 
major airlines serving the specific city-pair market; Tables 4.8 and 4.9 
provide a breakdown by airline of those schedules. 
For the sake of variety and generality, I have also selected various 
major city-pair markets around the country t o demonstrate that the sched-
uling pattern illustrated for JFK is not particularly different . These 
data are shown in Table 4.10. 
The evidence presented simply does not confirm the notion of peaking 
and over-scheduling which analysts have supported repeatedly. The sched-
ules are smooth, and for the most part, spread evenly over the day. 
Table 4.6. a JFK Scheduled Arrivals by City 
8 am 9 10 11 
City 
Albany lb 
Atlanta 
Baltimore 1 
Boston 2 1 
Chicago 
Dallas-Ft. Worth 
Denver 
Ft . Lauderdale 2 
Los Angeles 
Miami 2 1 2 2 
Pittsburgh 1 
San Francisco 
San Juan 1 l 
Tampa 1 1 
Washington, D. C. 1 1 
aSource: [ 26] . 
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clndicates arrival during fi rst half of the hour . 
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Table 4.7. JFK Scheduled Departures by Citya 
8 a.m. 9 10 11 12 13 14 
City 
Albany 1 1 1 
Atlanta 
Baltimore 1 1 1 
Boston 1 1 
Chicago 1 1 
Dallas-Ft. Worth 1 1 
Denver 1 1 
Ft . Lauderdale 1 1 1 1 
Los Angeles 1 1 2 1 
Miami 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Pittsburgh 1 
San Francisco 1 1 1 1 1 
San Juan 1 2 2 
Tampa 1 1 1 1 1 
Washington, D. C. 1 1 1 1 2 1 
a 
Source: [ 26]. 
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15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1 1 1 1 
2 2 1 1 2 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 2 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 2 
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 
1 1 1 2 2 4 1 
1 1 1 2 1 1 
1 3 1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Table 4.8. a b JFK Scheduled Arrivals by Airline ' 
8 a.m . 9 10 11 
i c ty 
ALB AL 1 
ATL DL 
EA 
BA AL 
BOS AA 1 
TW 1 
ORD NW 
TW 
UA 
DFW BN 
DEN TW 
UA 
ITL DL 1 
EA 1 
NA 
LAX AA 
TW 
UA 
MIA EA 1 1 
DL 1 
NA 1 
PIT AL 
TW 1 
SFO AA 
TW 
UA 
SJU AA 1 
EA 1 
TPA NA 1 
EA 1 
DA 
WAS TW 
BN 1 
NA 1 
asourc.e: [26] . 
bRes tric.ted to major market carriers. 
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Table 4.9. JFK Scheduled Departures by Airlinea,b 
8 a . m. 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Ci ty 
ALB AL 1 1 1 
ATL DL 
EA 
BAL AL 1 1 
BOS DL 1 1 
TW 
ORD NW 1 
TW 
UA 1 
DFW BN 
DEN TW 1 
UA 1 
FTL DL 1 1 
EA 1 
NA 1 
LAX AA 1 1 1 
TW 1 
UA 1 
MIA EA 1 1 
DL 1 1 
NA 1 1 1 
PIT AL 1 
TW 
SFO AA 1 1 1 
TW 1 
UA 1 
SJU AA 1 1 1 
EA 1 1 
TPA NA 1 1 1 
EA 1 
DL 1 
WAS TW 
BN 1 
NA 1 1 1 
aSource: (26]. 
bR . d ' k i estricte to maJor mar et carr ers. 
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Table 4.10. Demonstration of the Absence of "Peaking" in Airline 
Scheduling: Scheduled Arrivalsa 
8 a.m . 9 10 11 12 13 
City Pair 
ORD - LGA AA 1 l l l l 
TW 1 1 1 
BOS - LGA EA 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AA 1 1 1 1 
LGA - DFW AA 2 1 
DEN - ORD UA 1 1 
co 1 
ORD - WAS(Nat)TW 1 1 
UA 1 1 2 1 
LAS - LAX WA 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MSP - ORD NW 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
LGA -ATL DL 1 2 
aSource: [ 26 ] . 
2 
1 
56 
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 
1 1 1 2 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
1 2 1 1 
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The impression of heavy peaking of service is quite understandable. 
Anyone going to an airport after 5 p.m. will see large numbers of passen-
gers together with their baggage, taxis, friends and relatives. The 
volume of passengers would logically create the impression that there must 
surely be a corresponding peaking of flights. Airline service on any 
given route is, almost always, spread through the day . 
The reason for this is simple economics. To intensify schedule 
activity for a few hours each day would require surplus resources in the 
form of extra planes, gates, flight and ground crew--over and above the 
levels required during the rest of the day . This would result in very 
expensive equipment sitting idle for most of the day, while waiting for 
a few hours of peak period operation . 
Normal airline practice is to put an aircraft into service early in 
the morning and run it well into the evening . For example: 
Delta 245
20 
Fort Wayne Detroit 6:00 a.m. - 6:20 a.m . 
Detroit Indianapolis 6 : 25 a . m. - 6:51 a.m. 
Indianapolis Atlanta 7:16 a.m. - 9 : 32 a .m. 
Atlanta Ft. Lauderdale 10: 16 a .m. - 11:45 a . m. 
Ft. Lauderdale Chicago (ORD) 12 :31 p .m. - 2:09 p.m. 
(DL 458) 
Chicago Atlanta 2:26 p.m. - 5:06 p.m. 
(DL 239) 
Atlanta Miami 6:03 p .m. - 7:35 p.m. 
20 
Source ( 26) and telephone conversation with Delta in New York. 
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The flight number will be changed and the aircraft will resume 
operations after servicing. Notice that this a ircraft will be arriving 
and departing Atlanta during the rush hour period; the passenger demand 
determined this, but note that this aircraft is in operation all day and 
night and not waiting to be used just for the Atlanta peak period. 
A simila r scenario could be sketched f or most JFK operations . 
Utilization is an economic fact of life for the scheduled carriers, so 
tha t any airline 's timetable would show a lack of bunching of service on 
a give n r ou t e . 
Situations do exist, however, in which an involuntary peaking occurs 
because of geography or time zones, beyond the control of the airline . 
Traffic arriving from the western United States will not reach the New 
York a r ea until late afternoon because of the combinat ion of five hours 
of flight time and t hree more hours due to time zones. 
For example, a flight out of California leaves a t 8 :00 or 8:30 a .m. 
The plane will not arrive in New York until late afternoon--about 4 :30 
or 5:00 p.m. After normal s ervic ing , it will depart within an hou r or so. 
There is no violation of the utiliza tion rule. The equipment is, in fact, 
in use all day; it just doesn't get into the New York area until late 
afternoon. 
Tables 4.11 and 4 .12 reveal a very clear cut case of bunching, in 
this case . international traffic. I nternational arrivals t end to be 
heaviest dur ing late afternoon while the departures are distinctively con-
centrated in the late evening . Even in this situation, the s chedules 
Table 4 .11. 
Amsterdam 
Athens 
Copenhagen 
Frankfurt 
London 
Madrid 
Paris 
Rome 
a JFK Scheduled International Arrivals 
9 a.m. 10 11 12 13 
1 
1 
asource : [27]. 
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Table 4 .12 . 
City 
Amsterdam 
Athens 
Copenhagen 
Frankfurt 
London 
Madrid 
Paris 
Rome 
a JFK Scheduled International Departures 
9 a . m. 10 11 12 
1 2 
1 
a Source: [27]. 
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are still at very low hourly levels and relatively spread over the 
relevant time period . 
With the five hours lost going from New York to London (Western 
Europe), not to mention upwards of eight to ten hours for routes to Eastern 
Europe, the Middle East and India, many periods are impractical for trans-
atlantic departures. A departure from New York at 1500 hours would mean 
an 0240 hours arrival in London. This is a highly undesirable t ime when 
you take into consideration customs, currency exchange , hotel check-in, 
and so forth. Thus, international departures peak in the evening, when 
21 
they will permit arrival first thing the next morning. 
A cross-section view of Kennedy traffic demonstrates the relationship 
between major traffic peaking and the presence of long haul service. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 provide an F.A.A.-generated breakdown of traffic ac-
cording to stage length. The tables are self- explanatory and serve to 
illustrate the dominant role of long haul traffic in the JFK (New York) 
market. Figure 4.2 shows that during the evening rush hours, over half 
of the activity involved flights of over 1,000 miles . Also notice that 
the short and medium haul flights do show what could technically be called 
peaking, but that the contribution to overall peak hour activity is very 
small by comparison with the long haul gr oup. 
Taking a composite picture of all t ypes of traffic, ther e will be in 
total a peaking of activity, but clearly, this is not a deliberate 
21 
Another factor which constrains international scheduling is that 
many European airports close after midnight and may not r eopen until 0500 
or 0600 the next morning . 
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managerial decision. It is not a case of holding planes idle all day in 
readiness for the peak hour. The planes are in use all day, some of them 
just don't get into New York-JFK area traffic until late in the day because 
of time zone problems. 
In summary then, airline schedules are spread throughout the day and 
are not bunched during peak hours as economic analysts and much of the 
traveling public have assumed. Economic rationality dictates utilization 
of aircraft during as many hours of the day as possible . 
The peaking which I have detected at JFK is a function of the long-
haul nature of over half the airport's operations. Combining this fact 
with our concept of scheduling and passenger demand, and the all-important 
geographic time zone element, an involuntary peaking occurs which is es-
sentially beyond the control of the airline scheduler. 
Before closing, let me reiterate my introductory remarks as a 
qualification at this point: the preceding analysis is designed to show 
the pattern of scheduling by the airlines and as such does not preclude 
the possiblity that many of these flights have generated various social 
costs during their operations on a given day to and from Kennedy. Air-
line reaction to any alteration of existing price structures in response 
to these costs would hinge on the elasticity of demand for runway usage 
at specific times; to predict this response to a time varying price struc-
ture at a particular airport, the repercussions of each possible change 
on the complete schedule must be considered (see Appendix I). It is un-
likely that an airport planner or economist could make these estimates 
accurately [ 30 , p. 32] . 
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Air Traffic Control 
Previously, I have dealt with two components of the airside system: 
runway capacity and airline flight scheduling, the remaining component 
is one of the most interesting, complex and volatile of all--the airspace. 
The airspace layout in the New York metro area is probably one of 
the most complex in the country. A unique situation exists here which 
demands a special configuration of arrival and departure routes: JFK 
lies southeast of LGA by only 9 miles (measured from departure end of 
13R-JFK to 4-LGA) and east of EWR (Newark Airport) by only 19 miles 
(measured similarly). With three high density airports operating in such 
close proximity, special procedures are required. 
It was the recognition of this fact which prompted the F.A .A. to 
define the concept of a "terminal control area" in September, 1969. 
Specifically, they defined a "Group I Terminal Control Area," composed of 
10 of the busiest airports in terms of aircraft operations and passengers 
carried, where it was considered necessary for safety reasons t o have 
stricter requirements for operations within TCA than a t other locations. 
In a study on Midair Collisions [12, p. 8], it was found that 97% 
of terminal area accidents occurred below 8,000 feet AGL (above ground 
level), and that the vast majority involved conflict between general 
aviation and either an air carrier, military or another general aviation 
aircraft. Of particular note was that the mix of uncontrolled VFR and 
controlled IFR aircraft was cited as a basic causal factor of the air 
traffic conflicts. 
68 
In light of the fact that the density of air traffic is greater in 
Group I TCA's, and over 60% i nvolves air carrier oper ations-- just over 90% 
at JFK--conflicts resulting from the above traffic mix have a great paten-
tial for a major catastrophe . Thus, the F.A . A. deemed it essential to 
impose maximum safety requirements at Group I locations. Traffic was to 
be separated based on more stringent equipment and piloting requirements 
at the designated TCAs. 
In order to design a safe and efficient terminal control area, it was 
necessary to tailor the airspace configuration to the particular needs 
of the area, factors such as aircraft types, facilities at the airports 
within TCA, navigational aids available and the air traffic capability 
to meet the TCA concep t's needs had to be considered. 
The New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) controls IFR 
traffic arriving and departing the New York metropolitan area with the 
i f . 22 except on o tower enroute operations. The ARTCC operates in conjunc-
tion with the New York Common IFR Room (CIFRR) which is responsible for 
the terminal area portion of the flight. Overflights, i.e., aircraft 
with destinations outside the metro area, are generally routed east or 
west of the terminal areas and adjoining low altitude sectors to reduce 
congestion in the transition sections. 
Each arriving aircraft must be transitioned from the enroute phase 
to the terminal phase and sequenced with other arriving traffic before 
handoff to the CIFRR approach controller. The transition function consists 
22 
The control of IFR enroute traffic within delegated airspace between 
two or more adjacent approach control facilities . 
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of positioning the arrival flights so that they arrive at the handoff 
point in an orderly sequence, with adequate spacing, and at specified 
altitudes and speeds. 
The ARTCC sectors adjoining the CIFRR are responsible for the 
transition and handoff of aircraft to the appropriate approach controllers. 
In general, the preferred routes for arriving traffic terminate in a com-
mon enroute segment and approach fix or clearance limit depending upon 
the direction from which the flight comes. The CIFRR services a total of 
20 airports, including LGA, JFK and EWR. Tower enroute services are pro-
vided between the CIFRR and Philadelphia, Allentown, Wilkes-Barre, and 
Westchester towers, and McGuire Air Force Base. 
Kennedy and its satellite airports are served by the Bohemia (BOHLO), 
Southgate (SATES), Empire (ELLIS), and Shrimp holding/arrival fixes. 
Traffic arriving over these fixes is descended to specific altitudes 
(depending upon fix and runway in use), and then sequenced at intervals 
of five miles or more before being handed off to Kennedy approach at the 
CIFRR, except when holding is required. Holding aircraft are provided 
1,000 feet of altitude separation and then turned over to approach control . 
Vectoring from these fixes to final approach takes place, for the most 
part, in the area east of JFK. Handoff to the tower is accomplished at 
a point eight miles from the runway. 
For departure traffic, Standard Instrument Departure (SID) routes 
have been developed to accommodate JFK traffic. Departures are normally 
radar identified within one mile of the runway and, after noise abatement 
turns have been made, vectored through the Metroplex until handed off to 
70 
ARTCC. The designated handoff points are located between 20 and 35 miles 
from the airport. 
The proximity of the three airports, especially JFK and LGA, requires 
that a highly structured system of route and altitude restrictions be 
used to separate traffic between the airports as well as activity to and 
from the same airport, due to high traffic density and limited airspace . 
The flow of traffic through this network has a very direct impact upon 
runway utilization rates and delay patterns. In the initial chapter , 
mention was made of cer tain "factors" which profoundly affected the air-
side operation of the airport, one of which was aircraft mix. 
The mix of traffic has a direct effect upon capacity utilization in 
one very important way: size and wake turbulence. 23 Increased radar 
separation must be used when smaller and(or) lighter aircraft are i n- trail 
behind a heavy jet . Current landing procedures in conjunction with heavy 
jet traffic may be a contributing factor to the subcapacity utilization 
of the runways at JFK. 
Table 4.13 and Figures 4.3 through 4.5 demonstrate the tremendous 
proportion of heavy jet aircraft at JFK during most of the day. As men-
tioned earlier, Kennedy airport is regarded as the "heavy jet airport of 
the world. " This title is certainly well- illustrated in Figures 4.3- 4 . 5 . 
Closer examination of Figures 4.3 and 4.4 further confirms a point 
made at the end of the previous chapter . Notice how heavy departures peak 
toward the late evening hours--international departures--and in the earlier 
23
see Chapter II for a review of this relationship. 
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part of the morning--transcontinental traffic, and also how heavy arr ivals 
peak in the evening--transcontinental and international arrivals. Since 
it is the large, long-range aircraft which fly these routes, the long 
haul nature of the majority of Kennedy's traffic demonstrates i t self again , 
this time through analysis of air traffic composition. 
I believe it would be safe to say that the disadvantages of increased 
separation are, in part, offset by the effect that the jumbo or wide- body 
jets have had on the level of traffic activity. Given the tremendous 
passenger and cargo capacity of the heavy jet aircraft, more passengers 
and cargo can be carried using fewer aircraft. For example, in terms of 
passenger capacity as listed in the O.A.G. (26, p. 28], the following air-
craft equivalents show the reduction in traffic a 747 might generate : 
Number 
2-4 
3-4 
2-3 
1-2 
Approximate 747 Equivalents 
Type of Aircraft 
707 
727 
DC-8 
DC-8 (series 60) 
One of the more interesting statements about this aspect of TCA 
operations was made by Walters in regard to landing fee discrimination 
across classes of aircraft: "A small aircraft on a duty runway occupies 
as much airspace and runway as a 747" [ 31, p. 145]. In an associated 
footnote, he clarifies this by stating that "it may be claimed" that the 
smaller aircraft (prop driven) occupies more airspace due to approach 
speed differentials. 
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For some of the aircraft using Kennedy , the speed differential el~m~nl 
is significant, but for most of the operators of prop driven or small cor-
porate ai r craft, wake turbulence is the dominant factor . Controllers 
handling Learjets, Swearingens or DHTs will base separation distances 
mainly on the wake turbulence considerat i on. Certain speed limits appli-
cable to TCA and beneath TCA also help to reduce the difference in actual 
speeds among different aircraft.
24 
In terms of marginal effects, a small plane has a much greater 
in-trail impact than a larger jet in terms of economic costs. The marginal 
impact of a Piper Aztec in-trail behind a heavy 747 (or any wide-body or 
jet aircraft) is to spread aircraft out far more than were the Piper not 
there. Not only must the Piper be placed well-behind the jumbo, but fol-
lowing jet liners must be "over-separated" to prevent overtake in-trail. 
If this following aircraft was another 747, it would have to be placed 
possibly as far as 12 miles back. The Piper has generated a delay upon 
traffic flows by causing increased separation ahead and behind, resulting 
in relatively longer TCA flying time . Increase this to three or four 
general aviation operations during busy periods and the domino effect or 
marginal impact on costs to passengers and airlines becomes substantial. 
Finally, runway service times for the two classes of aircraft are 
not even close. Runway time requirements for heavy jets are far greater 
due to weight and extra separation required behind them, A small plane, 
however, can be clear of a runway very quickly, especially in the landing 
operation and thus, a much shorter service time. 
24rhis is not to say they totally disregard speed. 
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Walters goes on to say that through a reduction in t he general 
aviation component overall delays would be reduced to an average 10 min-
utes instead of the much higher values of greater than an ~our experienced 
during bad IFR conditions in 1967-68 . 
The author does not reveal where the figure 10 minutes comes from, 
but more importantly, average delays in bad IFR will not be 10 minutes 
as we shall see in a subsequent chapter dealing with weather in the terminal 
and enroute areas around New York. Bad IFR, more often than not, involves 
conditions which are extremel y conducive to very high delay levels. The 
C.A.B. designates a flight as being "on-time" if it operates within 15 
minutes of its published schedule. An average delay of 10 minutes would 
convey the notion that most flights are operating close to schedule ; this 
simply is not the case under severe meteorological conditions. 
Furthermore, eliminating G.A. traffic during bad IFR will not 
significantly affec t TCA delay levels since most general aviation pilots 
(the rational ones) will not be flying under these conditions anyway. 
Along a similar line, Grampp states that space in the air has a zero 
price due to its abundance [16, p. 23]. I have already illustrated a 
situation where l ocation in space may involve certain economic penalties, 
being 16-20 miles back from the preceding airliner rather than 3-5, due 
to the presence of a small aircraft in between, represents an additional 
cos t incurred by the trailing jet. In this sense, the airspace does have 
a price, the potential marginal cost imposed upon commercial airliners 
by G.A. operators by their presence in TCA traffic flows. 
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The airspace also has a price in terms of airway availability and 
fuel consumption. Space in the air appears abundant until we examine 
navigation charts for high and low altitude routes in the transport-intense 
Northeast Corridor. Resembling an intersecting network of highways, the 
airspace for this area is probably one of the most intensely used in the 
country. This means that certain routings and(or) altitudes which would 
ensure more economical operation of the aircraft may not be available to 
a particular flight. 
Because of the relationship between aircraft speed, altitude a nd fuel 
consumption rate, the overall flight profile flown by an aircraft is an 
important factor in determining fuel burn. For instance, an aircraft can 
adopt a high rate of climb, a cruise climb, or something in between these 
two extremes. The actual climb profile performed by departing aircraft 
depends partly upon company regulations and also the ATC departure clear-
ance in effect for the routing. 
In the cruise mode, flight may be performed at a constant flight 
level, or the aircraft may take advantage of the continual reduction in 
aircraft gross weight (resulting from fuel consumption) and perform a 
"gradual climb " profile to increase altitude to maintain an optimum rate 
of fuel burn. 
If the aircraft cruises at constant altitude, at some point in this 
level cruise, because of reduced weight, the aircraft is in effect being 
operated at a lower altitude than optimum for a given weight and airspeed 
and, hence, begins to consume fuel at a faster rate. A gradual climb 
80 
profile may not be possible because of conflic ts with other traffic. In 
congested airspace such as the Northeast Corridor, with aircraft operating 
in both directions, the gradual climb profile would require considerable 
"sterilization" of airspace between requested and operating altitude. In 
other words, in congested or heavily used airspace where altitude flexi-
bility may not be readily available, aircraft may incur a fuel burn penalty 
because of ATC traffic considerations. 
In summary then, we have seen that the presence of heavy jet aircraft 
in the traffic pattern can result in somewhat less than full-capacity 
capability utilization due to wake turbulence considerations and the sub-
sequent radar separations. On the other hand, we saw that these jumbo 
or wide-body aircraft permit the airlines to car r y greater payloads using 
fewer aircraft, resulting in a reduction in air traffic . 
The deviation from full capaci t y utilization is minimized (given 
current usable technology) with an a ll jet traffic l ineup but becomes 
significantly large with a jet-general aviation mix. Certain techniques 
and procedures are currently used or are being developed to reduce this 
deviation in the future. 
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CHAPTER V. " ON A CLEAR DAY .. " 
Traffic Analysis 
In this chapter I intend to show that Kennedy International can run 
traffic with very low average levels of delay and that the primary cause 
of delay in the New York area is not inadequate facilities, airline sched-
uling or heavy jets, but something over which our control is, at best, 
indirect. 
25 26 
Initially, flight strips and CATER LOGS covering three days of 
operations at JFK were obtained (see Table 5 .1 for examples of each) . 
Through the use of this data in conjunction with the Official Airline 
Guide for that period, delay estimates were calculated for Kennedy arrivals. 
During the hours for which data were collected, a number of flights had 
to be left out of the tabulations since they were not listed in the O.A . G. 
and no scheduled arrival times could be determined. Table 5.2 contains a 
27 sample page from the data compiled; certain flights are listed in the 
table with a square around their approximated delay times (for example, 
NW 222, 8-9 a.m.), these were exceptionally large by comparison with the 
25Flight strips were courtesy of the New York Common IFR Room. 
26 Three days were used instead of one because of certain fluctuations 
in delay time. For instance, EA 191 was 4 and 2 minutes early on 9/30/77 
and 10/7/77, respectively, but was 31 minutes late on 10/8/77. It seemed 
more appropriate to average the days together to compensate for odd combina-
tions such as that rather than just use one. 
27 
The remainder of the data was omitted due to the unnecessary amount 
of extra time and cost (218 flights listed) involved in preparing it for 
incorporation into the study. 
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others. In view of the fact that no major delays were recorded in New 
York airspace, these exceptional delays were assumed to have occurred at 
the originating airport or enroute outside the NYARTCC area, as such they 
were ignored to avoid distortion of the delay picture for the Kennedy-
New York area. 
The actual calculation of the delays involved a comparison of 
approximate and scheduled arrival time at the gate. Approximate gate 
arrival was figured by taking the landing or touchdown time for each oper-
ation (CATER LOG) and adding on another 10 minutes for taxiing time to the 
gate position. At an airport the size of Kennedy, the amount of time from 
28 landing until reaching the gate averages 10 minutes. This time will 
actually vary as a function of an airline's terminal location with respect 
to the landing runway29 in use at a specific time (see Table 5.3). The 
10 minute figure is also used by Kennedy Tower personnel in determining 
delays for both arrivals and departures. 
This procedure was performed for each flight and then compared with 
the arrival times published in the O.A. G., which are times at which the 
aircraft should arrive at the gate. The differences calculated for each 
of the three days were then combined to provide an "average delay" for 
h . l' d 30 eac operation 1ste . 
28
rnformation provided by Chief, Kennedy TRACAB through personal 
communication, December 14, 1977. 
29
For example, taxi times for Eastern and Delta arrivals will vary 
greatly if landings are being conducted on 13R (short) as opposed to 4R 
(long). 
30 
To make the numbers a bit more realistic, I have assumed that any 
minor delays at the airport of origin were made up for enroute and that 
the constant taxi time will offset any actual ground delays at JFK. 
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The final step was then to compress the "average delay" into an 
"average hourly delay" as shown in Table 5.4, along with a distribution 
of the flights according to specific levels of delay. 
Table 5.3. Taxiing Distance Information 
Given a specific arrival runway the following major airlines may 
experience above average taxiing times: 
4R 131 
United Northwest 
Braniff World 
Dominicana Delta 
Eastern Eastern 
American Air Panama 
Olympic Pan Am 
Allegheny 
221 International Arrivals Building 
National 31R 
BOAC 
Air Canada Eastern 
American Air Panama 
Olympic Northwest 
United World 
Braniff Delta 
Dominicana United 
Dominicana 
American 
Olympic 
Braniff 
The significance of this information can be seen by examining the 
average hourly figures: they are very low and in some instances, almost 
negligible. In other words, under favorable conditions, normal arrival 
traffic at Kennedy can be accommodated with very low, almost insignificant 
levels of average delay . A look at the distributional data in the lower 
88 
Table 5 . 4 . Arrivals 
Average Hourly Number Numbe r Numbe r 
Hour Delay (Minutes) Late Early On Time 
0800-lOOOa (2.08) 9 3 
1000- 1200a (4.98) 10 3 
1200-1400a (7 . 53) 14 1 
1400-1600a (4.06) 19 10 
1600-1700 3 . 07 17 18 
1700-1800 (8 . 90) 16 5 
1800-1900 (5 . 21) 12 2 
1900-2000 (4.81) 13 7 
2000- 2100 (5 . 87) 16 7 
2100-2200 . 92 6 6 
2200- 2300 (1. 73) 7 3 
139 64 
Total = 208 
OVERALL AVERAGE DELAY= (3.74) 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Late (Minutes) II Aircraft i. of Total 
1- 5 40 28.8 
6-10 40 28.8 
11-15 29 20 . 8 
16- 20 13 9 . 4 
21-25 8 5.7 
over 26 9 6.5 
139 100.0 
aThese hours combined due to the small number of arrivals during 
these hours. 
1 
2 
1 
1 
5 
89 
half of Table 5.4 reveals that roughly 57% of the recorded flights were 
within 10 minutes of their schedule, and if we use the CAB's on-time 
criteria, 31 78.4% of the flights would be regarded as on time. 
Weather 
This section probably represents the most striking departure from the 
standard approach previoualy employed by economic analysts in the discus-
sion of airport congestion (not that my previous chapters have taken the 
traditional route, either). As far as I have been able to find, no section 
32 on weather has ever been included in an economic analysis of this topic; 
yet, as you shall see, weather is probably the dominant factor in conges-
tion and delay situations. 
Eakin and Bear, National Weather Service meteorologists with the 
Central Flow Control section of the Air Traffic Systems Command Center, 
have stated that major delays are almost always caused by weather phenomena 
of some sort (8, p . 13]: an airport closed or hampered by dense fog, 
runways blocked by deep snow, thunderstorms overhead, or by strong, gusty 
surface winds discouraging use of the most advantageous runways. 
Thunderstorms that develop to heights above most aircraft ceilings 
(about 40,000 feet), forming extensive and essentially solid lines, are 
one of the main problems for air traffic controllers. Circumnavigating 
individual storms causes no difficulty, but, if aircraft are forced to 
divert across different ARTCC boundaries, contact and control can be 
31
Within 15 minutes of scheduled time. 
32carlin and Park [5] included various weather categories as dummy 
variables in their regression analysis, but even here it was reduced to a 
quantitative element and not treated with the degree of importance that it 
warrants . 
90 
temporarily lost , and workload capacities can become strained. 
Thunderstorms present a special problem to the New York Center area. Air-
space is so limited that a single thunderstorm can disrupt the flow of 
traffic, and a line of any extent causes a near catas trophe . Reroutes 
and stops on traff i c are not unusual during severe weather . 
Aircraft delays due to weather are also likely to depend upon r athe r 
small increments of the e lement involved. Surface wind winds of only 
20 to 30 knots, if from a certain direction, will cause large delays; yet, 
a change in the wind of only a few degrees or knots will make possible an 
immediate improvement of the situation. 
The ARTCC ' s are also very i nterested in the location of the jet 
stream, because i t may affect the number of long distan ce flights trav-
ersing their areas and thus, affect the complexity of their tasks. Clear 
air turbulence (CAT) is also of interest because it of ten causes deviations 
from established routes, thus disrupting Center operations . 
Analysis of delays for this phase of the study was developed f r om 
NASCOM reports which list by hour the number of aircraft delayed, average 
delay in minutes and the cause of the delays broken down by facili t y 
(NYARTCC, CIFRR, JFK TRACAB). 33 April, July, Oc t ober, and December , 1977, 
are shown in Tables 5.5b- f (with abbreviations given in Table 5 .5a) . 
A careful examination of the informat ion presented in Tables 5 . 5b-
5.5f (tedious though it may seem) reveals one ver y dis tinc t and unmis takable 
element in so many of the explanations of delays to Kennedy (in some 
33 
NASCOM reports average de l ays greater than or equal to 30 minutes. 
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Table 5 .5a . Abbreviations Used i n Tables 5.Sb-5.5f 
A/C Aircraft 
MAPS Missed Approaches 
RVR Runway Visual Range 
SWAP Severe Weathe r Avoidance Procedures 
TRW Thunderstorm, moderate rain shower 
20 MiiT 20 miles in trail 
TSTMS Thunderstorms 
VAPS Visual Approaches 
Wx Weather 
ZNY New York ARTCC 
JFK Kennedy Tower 
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cases, the Metro area in general) flights: weather phenomena of some sort 
were the cause of the delays in nearly every instance. Elaboration or any 
extensive text dealing with this conclusion would be, at best, useless 
reiteration of what these tables already demonstrate so clearly and 
dramatically. 
In conjunction with this, there is one other item which I neglected 
to mention during my traffic analysis of the preceding section; it seemed 
more appropriate to present it now in light of the above results from NASCOM . 
The weather for the three sample days from which I derived JFK arrival 
delays, was very good VFR, 34 which means excellent visibility and clear 
skies or unrestricted ceilings. 
In summary, we have seen that the airspace in the New York area 
(TCA and neighboring Center areas) is a very highly organized and con-
trolled entity which is designed with the purpose of providing a safe and 
efficient flow of air traffic to and from the New York airports. With 
good meteorological conditions (VFR), this system operates extremely well, 
with delays to flight operations well within a tolerable range, but given 
unfavorable winds or adverse weather of varying intensity or severity, 
traffic flows will be disrupted (the extent of the disruption will be a 
function of the level of severity of the weather) and alternate routings 
and(or) special procedures may be required culminating in large delays and 
some disgruntled passengers. 
34 
Information pr ovided by Kennedy Tower Chief in personal connnunication, 
December 14 , 1977. 
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CHAPTER VI . TEN YEARS AFTER: 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The contributing factors to the airport congestion crisis fall under 
two general headings: 
1. Bunching of schedules by airlines creating critical levels of 
traffic during peak periods; excessive levels of scheduling 
putting a strain on airport capabilities; and 
2. Inadequate runway capacity in combination with the above, 
resulting in overused facilities and delays. 
These were the targets at which a marginal cost-based user charge 
was to be aimed . The objective of such a policy was to require the mar-
ginal user to take into account the total extra delay caused by his(her) 
operation, including the delay the user incurs plus that imposed on others . 
Landing fees seem generally to be based on the average cost of the land-
ing area. For efficient use, fees would be equal to marginal cost, which 
Yance says are likely to be less than average cost, plus the congestion 
toll equal to the marginal external delay. In addition to this rationing 
function, the new system was promoted as an aid to economic logic in deci-
sion making since it would give airport planners a more economically sound 
and efficient basis upon which to make expansion decisions . Value of ser-
vice pricing was soundly criticized on the grounds that since it did not 
reflect real user valuation of the airport, expansion decisions based on 
it would be economically meaningless. 
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So there you have the two characteristics or causes of the problem 
as determined by previous economic analysts and the general solution which 
they believed would put the airports and airlines on a more efficient 
operating basis. 
In nearly complete contrast, here are the conclusions drawn from 
my own analysis: 
1. Bunching of scheduled flights by airlines simply does not exist. 
Schedules examined in this study for Kennedy traffic show a 
very smooth distribution of activity over the day. Levels of 
scheduling per hour per airline are by no means excessive in 
terms of sheer numbers. An involuntary peaking occurs at 
Kennedy, but this is strictly due to the long haul nature of 
the traffic in conjunction with geography and time zone consider-
ations, not a result of managerial policy. 
2. Runway capacity utilization at Kennedy indicates the existence 
of excess capacity the majority of the time; excess slots also 
exist under the HDTA Reservations system. 
3. The primary cause of major delays to JFK flights in the New York 
area is the weather. Major delay occurrences in the Center, 
Terminal and Tower areas were attributed to weather phenomena 
of some sort in nearly every instance on record from the five 
month sample for 1977. 
This evidence describes a situation which is as different as night 
and day in comparison with the 1968-70 scenario. The conditions which so 
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detrimentally characterized Kennedy in those congestion-riddled late 
1960s, as identified in the literature, no longer seem to exist to the 
extent previously described. 
It is on the basis of this evidence that the use of full marginal 
cost pricing should be questioned . There are four reasons for this. 
First, if a marginal cost schedule was devised, say, based on delay levels 
for the three-day sample I used for estimating arrival delays at JFK, the 
total delay cost would probably not be too much different from the weight-
based charge in effect now. If we can assume economies of scale in the 
operation of JFK airside facilities, then marginal cost will be less than 
aver age (as Yance said) and the additional "delay charge" will be very 
small. 
Second, the most likely time for large traffic-related delays to 
occur (other things being favorable) will be during the evening rush hours. 
I have already demonstrated the involuntary peaking which occurs at Kennedy 
during those hours due to the activity involving transcontinental and trans-
atlantic flights. This traffic operates under a twofold constraint: 
passenger demand within a time zone-oriented framework and alterations of 
flight schedules resulting from higher fees might cost the airline much 
of its passenger traffic unless the carrier is able to induce travelling 
at " awkward hours" through monetary incentives. In the case of international 
carriers, economic policy changes must be tempered with the very real 
and powerful element of diplomatic complications. In light of Kennedy 's 
(New York's) role as a major international gateway, such complications 
could be very extensive and eventually prove to be more persuasive than 
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economic consider ations. Therefore, margina l cos t landing fees might be 
a difficult policy to impose on this gr oup due to their operational nature, 
diplomatic i nvolvements and levels of s cheduling . 
Third, major delays to Kennedy traffic may almos t always be linked 
t o weather conditions . Where there are delays (whatever the cause), there 
are social cos ts, and with some of the major tie-ups the weather can induce, 
these cos t s can be substantial . My question is: How and to whom do we 
charge these costs? Le t us assume that between 1700-1800 hours inbound 
traffic from various cities is approaching the New York TCA with all 
flights on schedule. Now, suppose that a large mass of unstable warm air 
in the New York area has finally blossomed into an area of severe weather : 
poor visibility, moderate t o severe turbulence, aircraft ref using to de-
part due to thunderstorm off departure end of runway, reroutes, i n-trail 
restrictions--EXTENSIVE DELAYS . All of our inbound traffic wil l probably 
experience de lays of 30 minutes or more. The costs involved here are sub-
stantial, but who is responsible and who shall be penalized according to 
our theory of congestion pricing? 
The point being made is that when an a irport or airspace (TCA, ARTCC) 
is i n a delay posture, it will not always be clear how we should measure 
the de l ay, whom should be charged and for what r eason. Situations do exist 
wherein the economic theory does not provide a very applicable s olution . 
Fourth, certain decisions with respect to capacity expansion at JFK 
were made on the basis of economic criteria . In December of 1969, the 
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35 
Port of New York Authority approached the Environmental Studies Board 
about undertaking a study of the environmental impact an extension of 
runways at Kennedy International would have on Jamaica Bay and its sur-
rounding communities (23]. 
One of the conclusions was that any runway construction would damage 
the natural environment of the Bay, and reduce its potential use of conser-
vation, recreation and housing. The degree of that impairment would be 
dependent upon the amount of Bay area taken. To the extent that use of 
some Bay area for runways reduces the recreational potential of the Bay, 
the future opportunity for recreation of some New York City residents 
would be lost (an opportunity cost) so that others might have the benefits 
of air travel. But because the airport land and the Bay are owned by the 
City, there would be no direct charge to the air traveler for use of the 
Bay land if there was an expansion, as there would be no charge to recrea-
tional users if the airport is not expanded. Any public decision to use 
the Bay for expansion would have involved a transfer of social cost from 
one segment of the community to the other without any compensation from 
the users who benefit directly. 
Analysis s uch as this in conj unction with environmental and ecological 
impact statements in a cost-benefit f ramework was used to provide an 
economic-enviromental case against the City's plan for runway expansion 
into Jamaica Bay. 
35 
Representing a combination of the National Academy of Sciences and 
National Academy of Engineering. 
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As a result, the City of New York and the Port Authority elected to 
postpone any expansion plans for the Kennedy runway system in the near 
future. 
During this study, I have repeatedly made reference to the sizable 
reductions in the level of scheduling by the coannercial air carriers since 
1968. Economic history provides much insight into some of the changes 
which have taken place in the industry during the last several years, and 
which have altered the scenario since the late 1960s. 
Powerful economic forces in 1970 gave the scheduled airlines the worst 
financial results in their history. The national economic recession that 
began in 1969 and continued into 1970 slowed domestic passenger traffic 
growth almost to a halt in 1970 . Inflation continued to plague the in-
dustry at a rate of about 9 percent i n 1970 over 1969, almost double the 
national rate. The major portion of this pressure came from labor settle-
ments which i ncreased airline wages by some 15 percent in 1970. 
In response t o these and o ther adverse forces, many carriers cut 
flight schedules to eliminate unprofitable flights and reduce uneconomic 
competition (capacity agreements) . This began in the second half of 1970 
and by May, 1971, there were 5.2 percent fewer domestic flights scheduled 
than the same month of the prior year. 
Cost inflation continued to be a serious problem for the airlines in 
1971. Over the prior five years, inflation for the industry had grown at 
an average annual rate of 6.7 percent while that for the nation as a whole 
had been 4 . 4 percent. The single most important reason for this was that 
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airline wage rates continued to be among the highest in private industry. 
Landing fees, which account for one of the largest portions of airline 
airport costs had, in the prior ten years, risen more rapidly than the 
number of operations. This caused the cost per landing to more than triple 
in just a decade. 
By 1974, the scenario of growing inflation and deepening recession 
appeared again and had a severe impact on airline finances. With the 
Consumer Price Index showing an 11 percent increase for the year, the 
Airline Cost Index for 1974 showed an estimated increased of 18 percent 
over the year earlier . The principal cost item in 1974 was fuel. In 1974, 
the increase in the price of fuel cost to the airline industry was more 
than $1 billion in added costs. 36 
In the final analysis, the reduction in schedules of commercial 
airlines was brought about by economic factors . The combined trends of 
declining traffic growth resulting from an overall economic slowdown, in-
creased unused passenger capacity, and increased labor and fuel costs 
forced the airlines to become much more efficient in terms of scheduling 
and aircraft capacity utilization. 
In summary then, I feel that there is a very strong case against 
immediate implementation of an unadjusted or unmodified marginal cost pric-
ing policy. A middle ground exists between a situation where marginal 
cost pricing is strictly inappropriate and one in which we have full and 
immediate activation of such a policy. It would be difficult to justify 
36 
Statistical data derived from the annual report of the U.S. scheduled 
airline industry. 
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the latter extreme in terms of administrative costs , ripple effects upon 
scheduled service, and overall political, economic and system disruption. 
One corrnnonly offered suggestion in this respect is the use of a trial 
and error technique for gradually introducing the new pricing policy and 
making adjustments accordingly . Although a cautious approach, such a 
technique may be more bureautic and political exercise than some 
airport managers and authorities are willing to deal with, given the 
very reactionary nature of powerful aviation interests groups. 
On the other hand, trying to prove that congestion tolls are strictly 
inappropriate is an exercise in f utility in terms of najor hub airports. 
Delays do occur, no doubt exists on this point; to completely negate the 
need for congestion tolls the analyst would have to prove that there are 
no marginal or "interaction" effects among aircraft. The only period for 
which the analyst might be able to develop a case for this would be between 
the hours of 11 p.m. and 7 a.m . , during these hours marginal delay costs 
are equal to zero for all prac tical purposes (30, p. 26]. During "normal" 
operating hours it would be very difficult to prove the absence of inter-
actions among aircraft. These interactions are caused by traffic levels, 
37 airspace structure, and other major factors which have been examined 
in this study . 
37For example, for most departing flights from JFK there is a climb 
restric tion to 5,000 feet out to an intersection or VORTAC in the TCA after 
which they are cleared to the assigned route and alti tude . This restric-
tion puts a limitation on the aircraft ' s climb out and it may be said that 
this represents a fuel burn penalty in that the aircraft is not able to 
more rapidly r each a more efficient altitude. This restriction, however, 
is imposed due to Kennedy arrivals and LaGuardia traffic also operating 
in TCA and its purpose is to ensure safe and efficient flow of aircraft. 
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The theory of the marginal cost pricing policy is one which, al though 
subject t o much qualifying discussion in the liter ature, i s correct and 
economically appropria te for airport landing charges . The exact level 
and method of implementat ion is an immediate issue with which airport 
authorities, planners and economists must come to grips. Although 
such a policy would establish a more economically efficient measure of 
capac ity expansion in the long run , it migh t also result in traffic 
pattern changes at effected airports in the form of some traffic 
diversion or simply changes in the quality of service, as well as 
possible changes in airline passenger fares reflecting new airport policy. 
In terms of noneconomic changes , new aircraft and air traffic 
38 technology are becoming realities which over the next 5-10 years will 
do much to improve the operat ional efficiency of the airspace/airport 
system and , as such, will help lessen the magnitude and impact of a new 
pricing policy. 
Simply put, more must be known about airline reaction to the 
imposition of marginal cost pricing. Before any a irport authority or 
planner could be expec t ed to put such a strikingly new policy into action , 
3~icrowave Landing Systems will eventually replace the narrow beam 
ILS systems employed at commercial airports with ones that provide a much 
more flexible and larger landing app roach area . Planes on an ILS course 
are now brought through the approach area to the runway one at a time in 
a long single file. The MLS lets planes head into what is, in effect , a 
huge electronic f unnel whose mouth is 80° wide and 20° high. With MLS, 
arriving aircraft can ente r from several directions at different speeds, 
flying various curved approaches toward separate electronic gates. MLS 
will thus permit more efficient use of runways by different types of air-
craft and will give controllers greater choice in routing planes away 
from built up areas. It is estimated that in a decade or two all major 
airports will be served by this system. 
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they must have some idea of the repercussions that such a change will have 
on traffic levels, services and conununity-airport relations. Further 
study of approaches that contribute to efficient utilization of existing 
airport capacity should be encouraged and supported. To evaluate the 
potential economic (and political) risks and the possible benefits of 
peak hour pricing, ac tual experience and not theory is needed . 
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APPENDIX 
Suppose the routing of Flight 101 is as shown in Table A.l. It may 
be a useful exercise to investigate the implications of a minor change in 
the departure time at Chicago. A departure at 6 p . m. instead of 5 p.m. 
would eventually land the aircraft at Honolulu after midnight. Not only 
is this in itself undesirable, but the flight would break connections 
from three other flights. and a change in each of these would have its 
own repercuss i ons. In addition to other problems caused by this extremely 
late arrival, the aircraft could also not leave Honolulu at 8 a.m . the next 
morning because the flight c rew layover limits would be violated . On the 
other hand, the flight could not be scheduled to depart Chicago at 4 p .m. 
because this would mean a 9 a.m . departure from London. This is unrealistic 
because the flight is a turn-around and requires two hours on the ground 
after arriving from New York the previous night. In addition, two flights, 
one from Frankfurt and the other from Paris, arrive in London at 9:30 a .m. 
and make a connec tion with Flight 101 . 
The flight cannot arrive at Chicago between 4 p .m. and 5 p.m. because 
of the quota on the number of flights arriving in Chicago during this hour . 
In any case , Flight 101, because of the unavailability of a gate position, 
cannot arrive in Los Angeles before 7 p.m. In order to free a gate for 
Flight 101, flights have to be changed at San Diego, Phoenix, and Dallas . 
Even if a gate were available, the flight could not depart Los Angeles 
39source : ( 29, pp . 110-111). 
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until 8 p.m . because no flight crew is available until then. Due to 
federal flight time limits, 8 p.m. is the earliest departure time the 
available crew can take out the flight ; it would not be economical to have 
an additional crew based in Los Angeles . 
Table A.l. Routing of Flight 101 
Station Connecting Flights Local Time 
LV 10:00 a.m. London Frankfurt, Paris 
AR 12:00 noon New York Boston, Providence, Hartford 
LV 2:00 
AR 3 : 30 
LV 4 :00 
Chicago AR 4:00 
LV 5:00 
Los Angeles AR 7:00 
LV 8:00 
Honolulu AR 11:30 
p.m. 
p.m. 
p .m. 
p.m . 
p.m. 
p.m . 
p.m. 
p.m. 
Syracuse 
Indianapolis, Columbus 
Washington, Oklahoma City, St . 
Louis 
New York, Denver 
Flight 101 cannot leave Detroit earlier than 4 p.m . because it 
connects with flights from Toronto, Cleveland, Toledo, and Syracuse. Mov-
ing back a little to New York, although the minimum ground time is only 
75 minutes for an international arrival, the flight is scheduled to depart 
at 2 p . m. because there are three flights that arrive in New York at 1:15 
p.m. and would connect with Flight 101. In order to acconunodate an 
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earlier departure, changes would have to be made to flights from Boston, 
Providence, and Hartford. Although there is another potential connecting 
flight at 1:45 p.n., Flight 101 cannot be delay any longer because this 
would leave the through-passengers to Detroit and Chicago dissatisfied 
enough to switch to the competitor's flight from London to Detroit and 
Chicago via Boston . Because of a highly competitive environment, the 
amount of flexibility available to the schedule planner is very limited. 
Even though it may be very costly from every aspect, flights are scheduled 
to meet competition. 
These considerations are only a few of the problems that would occur 
if Flight 101 were changed in (on the surface) a seemingly insignificant 
way. This hypothetical example illustrates the interrelationship and chain 
reactions that can t ake place to acconnnodate a change in arrival or depar-
ture time of as little as 30 minutes. In analyzing the costs involved in 
making a change to the schedule, one must remember to also consider th.e 
administrative costs of publications, promotion, and notification. If a 
number of small changes have been made, it may become necessary to publish 
a new system timetahle. The publication and distribution costs of the 
r evised timetable can be quite substantial. Advertisement and promotion 
affected by these revisions may also be changed. Finally, the new changes 
must also be filed with the appropriate government agencies, such as the 
Board and the Post Office Department. 
